Edited books:

G. (2021). Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill. (Co-editor: L. Moretti) (Brill)

F. (2020). Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Co-editor: P. Graham) (OUP, Amazon.)

E. (2019). The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. (Co-editors: M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson) (Routledge, Amazon.)

D. (2018). Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editors: N. Kellen and J. Wyatt) (Palgrave Macmillan, Amazon.)

C. (2017). Epistemic Pluralism. London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editor: A. Coliva) (Palgrave Macmillan, Amazon.)

B. (2013). Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. New York: Oxford University Press.(Co-editor: Cory D. Wright) (OUP USA, OUP UK.)

A. (2010). New Waves in Truth. London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editor: Cory D. Wright) (Palgrave Macmillan, Amazon.)


Journal articles, volume chapters, encyclopedia entries:

45. (202x). Epistemic entitlement. To appear in K. Sylvan (ed.): The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. (Preprint)

44. (2024). The Emergence of Analytic Philosophy in Korea. To appear in APA Studies on Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies, 23(2). 

43. (2022). The problem of mixed beings. Philosophical Studies, 179: 3113-3121. (Part of a book symposium on Kris McDaniel's The Fragmentation of Being.) (Journal - Preprint)

42. (2022). Entitlement, generosity, relativism and structure-internal goods. Metaphilosophy, 53: 486–511. (Journal - Preprint)

41. (2021). Extended knowledge overextended? In K. L. Lai (ed.): Knowers and Knowledge in East-West Philosophy (191–233), Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring) (Publisher - Preprint)

40. (2021). Den originale og den kopierede natur. (Original and copied nature.) In A.-M. H. Andersen, A. K. Gjerløff & K. E. Vad (eds.): Hvilken natur? –– en antologi om naturbegrebet (77–85). (Which nature? An anthology about the concept of nature.) Biologiforbundet. (Preprint)

39. (2021). Cornerstone epistemology: scepticism, mathematics, non-evidentialism, consequentialism, pluralism. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen & L. Moretti (eds.): Non-Evidentialist Epistemology (230–264). Brill. (Preprint)

38. (2021). Non-Evidentialist Epistemology: Introduction and Overview. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen & L. Moretti (eds.): Non-Evidentialist Epistemology (1–24). Brill. (Co-author: Luca Moretti.) (Preprint)

37. (2021). The paradox of conceptualizability. Philosophia, 49: 555–563. (Preprint)

36. (2021). Austere truth pluralism. In M. P. Lynch, J. Wyatt, J. Kim, and N. Kellen (eds.): The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Readings (629–656). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Co-authors: F. Ferrari and S. Moruzzi) (Preprint)

35. (2020). Dretske & McDowell on Percpetual Knowledge, Conclusive Reasons, and Epistemological Disjunctivism. Philosophical Issues, 30: 148–166. (Co-author: P. Graham) (Preprint)

34. (2020). Moderate truth pluralism and the structure of doxastic normativity. American Philosophical Quarterly, 57(4): 355–375. (Preprint)

33. (2020). On moderate pluralism about truth and logic. Philosophical Forum 51(2): 143–160. (Preprint)

32. (2020). Recent work on epistemic entitlement. American Philosophical Quarterly, 57(2): 193–214. (Co-author: P. Graham) (Preprint)

31. (2020). On the normative variability of truth and logic. Inquiry, 63(3-4): 236–257. (Preprint - Journal)

30. (2020). Pluralist consequentialist anti-scepticism. In P. Graham & N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): Epistemic Entitlement (297–326). Oxford University Press. (Preprint)

29. (2020). Introduction and Overview: Two Entitlement Projects. In P. Graham & N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): Epistemic Entitlement (1–34) Oxford University Press. (Co-authors: Peter Graham, Zachory. Bachman, and Luis Rosa.) (Preprint)

28. (2019). Epistemic peer disagreement. In M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology (174–184). (Co-author: Filippo Ferrari). (Preprint)

27. (2019). Introduction. In M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology (xvi–xxii). (Co-authors: Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson.)

26. (2018). Strong truth pluralism. In J. Wyatt, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, and N. Kellen (eds.): Pluralisms in Truth and Logic (107–130). Palgrave McMillan. (Co-author: Seahwa Kim.) (Preprint - Palgrave Macmillan)

25. (2018). Introduction. In J. Wyatt, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, and N. Kellen (eds.): Pluralisms in Truth and Logic (3–34). Palgrave McMillan. (Co-authors: J. Wyatt and N. Kellen.) (Preprint - Palgrave Macmillan)

24. (2018). Truth Pluralism. In M. Glanzberg (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Truth (543-575). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: M. P. Lynch) (Preprint)

23. (2018). Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism. Synthese, 195: 2935-2966. (Preprint - Published version)

22. (2017). Pure epistemic pluralism. In A. Coliva and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism (47-92). London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Preprint - Palgrave Macmillan)

21. (2017). Introduction. In A. Coliva and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism (1-19). London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-author: A. Coliva) (Preprint - Google Books)

20. (2016). Hume's Principle and entitlement: on the epistemology of the neo-Fregean programme. In P. Ebert and M. Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics (185–201). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Preprint - Oxford Scholarship Online)

19. (2014). All the (Many, Many) Things We Know: Extended Knowledge? Philosophical Issues, 24: 24–38. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring) (Preprint - Published version)

18. (2014). On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Synthese, 191: 2445–2470. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring and J. U. Hansen) (Preprint - Published version)

17. (2014). Pluralism x 3: truth, logic, metaphysics. Erkenntnis, 79: 259–277. (A special issue on logical monism, pluralism, and relativism edited by D. Cohnitz, P. Pagin, and M. Rossberg.) (Preprint - Published version)

16. (2013). The epistemology of absence-based inference. Synthese, 190: 2573–2593. (Co-author: J. Kallestrup) (Preprint - Published version)

15. (2013). The epistemology of inclusiveness. Synthese, 190: 1185–1188. (Co-authors: K. Ahlstrom-Vij, K. Kappel) (Published version)

14. (2013). Introduction. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (10–38). New York: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint - Google Books)

13. (2013). Pluralism about truth as alethic disjunctivism. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (87–112). New York: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint - Google Books)

12. (2012). Recent work on alethic pluralism. Analysis, 72: 588–607. (Preprint - Published version)

11. (2012). Pluralist theories of truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright)

10. (2012). True alethic functionalism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20: 125–133. (Symposium on Lynch's Truth as One and Many). (Preprint - Published version)

9. (2011). Truth as One(s) and Many: on Lynch's alethic functionalism. Analytic Philosophy, 52: 213–230. (Co-author: D. Edwards) (Preprint - Published version)

8. (2010). Second-order knowledge. In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (586–596). London: Routledge. (Co-author: C. Kelp) (Preprint - Routledge)

7. (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In C. D. Wright and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth (205–217). London: Palgrave Macmillan). (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint - Palgrave Macmillan)

6. ((2010). Open-endedness, schemas and ontological commitment. In Noûs, 44: 329–339. (Co-author: M. Rossberg) (Preprint - Published version)

5. (2010). Stabilizing alethic pluralism. Philosophical Quarterly, 60: 92–108. (Preprint - Published version)

4. (2009). Solving the Caesar Problem without categorical sortals. Erkenntnis, 71: 141–155. (Preprint - Published version)

3. (2009). Entitlement, value and rationality. Synthese, 171: 443–457. (Preprint - Published version)

2. (2006). What can the problem of mixed inferences teach us about alethic pluralism? The Monist, 89: 103–117. (Preprint - Published version)

1. (2006). Entitlements, good and bad. Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 7: 58–82. (Preprint - Published version)


Conference proceedings and newsletters:

d. From metaphysical pluralism to alethic pluralism? In Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy 39 (201–208). Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center.

c. (with Marcus Rossberg) "McGee on Open-ended Schemas". In H. Bohse et al. (eds.): Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.6, Sixth International Congress of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy (Paderbon: mentis).

b. "Entitlement in mathematics", in MATHNET 12: Newsletter of the Danish Network for the History and Philosophy of Mathematics.

a. "Considerations on neo-Fregean ontology" , pp. 504–511 in R. Bluhm and C. Nimtz (eds.): Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.5, Fifth International Congress of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy (Paderbon: mentis), 2004.