Edited books:

G. (2021). Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill. (Co-editor: L. Moretti) (Brill)

F. (2020). Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Co-editor: P. Graham) (OUP, Amazon.)

E. (2019). The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. (Co-editors: M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson) (Routledge, Amazon.)

D. (2018). Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editors: N. Kellen and J. Wyatt) (Palgrave Macmillan, Amazon.)

C. (2017). Epistemic Pluralism. London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editor: A. Coliva) (Palgrave Macmillan, Amazon.)

B. (2013). Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. New York: Oxford University Press.(Co-editor: Cory D. Wright) (OUP USA, OUP UK.)

A. (2010). New Waves in Truth. London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editor: Cory D. Wright) (Palgrave Macmillan, Amazon.)


Journal articles, volume chapters, encyclopedia entries:

43. (2022). The problem of mixed beings. Philosophical Studies, 179: 3113-3121. (Part of a book symposium on Kris McDaniel's The Fragmentation of Being.) (Journal - Preprint)

42. (2022). Entitlement, generosity, relativism and structure-internal goods. Metaphilosophy, 53: 486–511. (Journal - Preprint)

41. (2021). Extended knowledge overextended? In K. L. Lai (ed.): Knowers and Knowledge in East-West Philosophy (191–233), Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring) (Publisher - Preprint)

40. (2021). Den originale og den kopierede natur. (Original and copied nature.) In A.-M. H. Andersen, A. K. Gjerløff & K. E. Vad (eds.): Hvilken natur? –– en antologi om naturbegrebet (77–85). (Which nature? An anthology about the concept of nature.) Biologiforbundet. (Preprint)

39. (2021). Cornerstone epistemology: scepticism, mathematics, non-evidentialism, consequentialism, pluralism. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen & L. Moretti (eds.): Non-Evidentialist Epistemology (230–264). Brill. (Preprint)

38. (2021). Non-Evidentialist Epistemology: Introduction and Overview. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen & L. Moretti (eds.): Non-Evidentialist Epistemology (1–24). Brill. (Co-author: Luca Moretti.) (Preprint)

37. (2021). The paradox of conceptualizability. Philosophia, 49: 555–563. (Preprint)

36. (2021). Austere truth pluralism. In M. P. Lynch, J. Wyatt, J. Kim, and N. Kellen (eds.): The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Readings (629–656). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Co-authors: F. Ferrari and S. Moruzzi) (Preprint)

35. (2020). Dretske & McDowell on Percpetual Knowledge, Conclusive Reasons, and Epistemological Disjunctivism. Philosophical Issues, 30: 148–166. (Co-author: P. Graham) (Preprint)

34. (2020). Moderate truth pluralism and the structure of doxastic normativity. American Philosophical Quarterly, 57(4): 355–375. (Preprint)

33. (2020). On moderate pluralism about truth and logic. Philosophical Forum 51(2): 143–160. (Preprint)

32. (2020). Recent work on epistemic entitlement. American Philosophical Quarterly, 57(2): 193–214. (Co-author: P. Graham) (Preprint)

31. (2020). On the normative variability of truth and logic. Inquiry, 63(3-4): 236–257. (Preprint - Journal)

30. (2020). Pluralist consequentialist anti-scepticism. In P. Graham & N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): Epistemic Entitlement (297–326). Oxford University Press. (Preprint)

29. (2020). Introduction and Overview: Two Entitlement Projects. In P. Graham & N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): Epistemic Entitlement (1–34) Oxford University Press. (Co-authors: Peter Graham, Zachory. Bachman, and Luis Rosa.) (Preprint)

28. (2019). Epistemic peer disagreement. In M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology (174–184). (Co-author: Filippo Ferrari). (Preprint)

27. (2019). Introduction. In M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology (xvi–xxii). (Co-authors: Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson.)

26. (2018). Strong truth pluralism. In J. Wyatt, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, and N. Kellen (eds.): Pluralisms in Truth and Logic (107–130). Palgrave McMillan. (Co-author: Seahwa Kim.) (Preprint - Palgrave Macmillan)

25. (2018). Introduction. In J. Wyatt, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, and N. Kellen (eds.): Pluralisms in Truth and Logic (3–34). Palgrave McMillan. (Co-authors: J. Wyatt and N. Kellen.) (Preprint - Palgrave Macmillan)

24. (2018). Truth Pluralism. In M. Glanzberg (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Truth (543-575). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: M. P. Lynch) (Preprint)

23. (2018). Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism. Synthese, 195: 2935-2966. (Preprint - Published version)

22. (2017). Pure epistemic pluralism. In A. Coliva and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism (47-92). London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Preprint - Palgrave Macmillan)

21. (2017). Introduction. In A. Coliva and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism (1-19). London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-author: A. Coliva) (Preprint - Google Books)

20. (2016). Hume's Principle and entitlement: on the epistemology of the neo-Fregean programme. In P. Ebert and M. Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics (185–201). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Preprint - Oxford Scholarship Online)

19. (2014). All the (Many, Many) Things We Know: Extended Knowledge? Philosophical Issues, 24: 24–38. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring) (Preprint - Published version)

18. (2014). On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Synthese, 191: 2445–2470. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring and J. U. Hansen) (Preprint - Published version)

17. (2014). Pluralism x 3: truth, logic, metaphysics. Erkenntnis, 79: 259–277. (A special issue on logical monism, pluralism, and relativism edited by D. Cohnitz, P. Pagin, and M. Rossberg.) (Preprint - Published version)

16. (2013). The epistemology of absence-based inference. Synthese, 190: 2573–2593. (Co-author: J. Kallestrup) (Preprint - Published version)

15. (2013). The epistemology of inclusiveness. Synthese, 190: 1185–1188. (Co-authors: K. Ahlstrom-Vij, K. Kappel) (Published version)

14. (2013). Introduction. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (10–38). New York: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint - Google Books)

13. (2013). Pluralism about truth as alethic disjunctivism. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (87–112). New York: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint - Google Books)

12. (2012). Recent work on alethic pluralism. Analysis, 72: 588–607. (Preprint - Published version)

11. (2012). Pluralist theories of truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright)

10. (2012). True alethic functionalism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20: 125–133. (Symposium on Lynch's Truth as One and Many). (Preprint - Published version)

9. (2011). Truth as One(s) and Many: on Lynch's alethic functionalism. Analytic Philosophy, 52: 213–230. (Co-author: D. Edwards) (Preprint - Published version)

8. (2010). Second-order knowledge. In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (586–596). London: Routledge. (Co-author: C. Kelp) (Preprint - Routledge)

7. (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In C. D. Wright and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth (205–217). London: Palgrave Macmillan). (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint - Palgrave Macmillan)

6. ((2010). Open-endedness, schemas and ontological commitment. In Noûs, 44: 329–339. (Co-author: M. Rossberg) (Preprint - Published version)

5. (2010). Stabilizing alethic pluralism. Philosophical Quarterly, 60: 92–108. (Preprint - Published version)

4. (2009). Solving the Caesar Problem without categorical sortals. Erkenntnis, 71: 141–155. (Preprint - Published version)

3. (2009). Entitlement, value and rationality. Synthese, 171: 443–457. (Preprint - Published version)

2. (2006). What can the problem of mixed inferences teach us about alethic pluralism? The Monist, 89: 103–117. (Preprint - Published version)

1. (2006). Entitlements, good and bad. Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 7: 58–82. (Preprint - Published version)


Conference proceedings and newsletters:

d. From metaphysical pluralism to alethic pluralism? In Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy 39 (201–208). Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center.

c. (with Marcus Rossberg) "McGee on Open-ended Schemas". In H. Bohse et al. (eds.): Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.6, Sixth International Congress of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy (Paderbon: mentis).

b. "Entitlement in mathematics", in MATHNET 12: Newsletter of the Danish Network for the History and Philosophy of Mathematics.

a. "Considerations on neo-Fregean ontology" , pp. 504–511 in R. Bluhm and C. Nimtz (eds.): Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.5, Fifth International Congress of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy (Paderbon: mentis), 2004.