Past events
Graduate Student Workshop
Date: Tuesday November 6, 2012.
Schedule:
Title: Criticisms against internalists' intuition
Speaker: Heejin Kwon (Seoul National University)
Abstract: In this paper, I will criticize the intuition that higher-order belief about justification of first-order belief can directly revise first-order belief. For the purpose of this, I will explain the process of this revision and show that there should be an assumption (General Assumption of Access to the Justification of Belief) in order for first-order belief to receive the normative pressure from higher-order belief. This is because higher-order belief about the justificatory status of first-order belief tells nothing about its objective status. Therefore, first-order belief does not have to be revised without the assumption, which connects two kinds of beliefs. In the course of argument, I criticize deontological conception of justification and contend that subjective justification cannot play a role to revise belief.
Title: A Critique of Interest-Relative Invariantism.
Speaker: Junyeol Kim (Seoul National University).
Abstract: In this paper, I will criticize Stanley's Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI) that knowledge partly depends on the practical interests of the subject of the knowledge. My points are two. First, IRI requires not only metaphysical ground but also semantic ground. However, Stanley seems to fail in providing both grounds. Second, the intuitions about knowledge-ascriptions that have triggered IRI do not have serious epistemic bearing. I will show that the intuitions are rather related to our overall rationality. If these are correct, Stanley's IRI suffers for the lack of ground.
Graduate Student Workshop
Date: Monday July 30, 2012.
Schedule:
Title: Does Superassertibility Satisfy the Equivalence Schema?
Speaker: Yong Sung Bong (Seoul National University).
Abstract: Crispin Wright, in Truth and Objectivity, argues that superassertibility is an adequate truth property for anti-realist's discourses. According to him, any property F is a truth property if and only if F satisfies equivalence schema. That is, he argues that a following schema holds a priori in anti-realist discourses: (ES) it is superassetible that p if and only if p. Thus he should prove that (ES) holds a priori in every anti-realist discourse. He actually presents two alleged proofs. But, in this paper, I shall argue that his two attempted proofs are unsuccessful. One of two alleged proofs can be proved by classical logic not by intuitionistic logic. However, there is a reason for Wright to use intuitionistic logic instead of classical logic, so this alleged proof cannot be successful. Another alleged proof is circular, so this also cannot be successful. Since his goal in Truth and Objectivity is to reshape realism/anti-realism debate and superassertibility as a truth property for any anti-realist discourses is a necessary element for completing his goal, if superassertibility, as I claim, cannot satisfy equivalence schema, his whole project would be collapsed.
Title: Outline of a Psychical Logic.
Speaker: Luke Malik (Osaka University).
Abstract: If a dualist is to be believed, then there are two kinds of phenomenon in the world: the physical and the psychical. We can consider these distinct in the sense that no equality relations exist between phenomenon of the two kinds. If we accept this, we might expect two distinct sets of statements: a physical set describing the physical equality relations and corresponding modalities and a psychical set describing psychical equality relations and corresponding modalities. Given we have two distinct types of statements we might accept two distinct languages. Sentences in a physicalist language will relate phenomenon physically in accordance with physicalist identities. Sentences in a psychical language will relate phenomenon psychically in accordance with psychical identities. While it may be somewhat clear what the structures and propositions of a physicalist language look like, not only to the physicalist but to the dualist, it may not be clear what the structures and propositions of a psychical language should look like. It is the aim of this paper to appropriate the structures of modal logic to show what the structure and propositions of a psychical language may look like and what conclusions may be drawn, thereof.
Graduate Conference
Date: May 5-6, 2012.
Venue: Yonsei International Campus.
Keynote speakers: Prof. Michael Lynch (University of Connecticut, Storrs) and Prof. Takashi Yagisawa (California State University, Northridge).
Conference page
Graduate Student Workshop
Date: Saturday March 24, 2012.
Schedule:
Title: Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Genuine Disagreement
Speaker: Wooram Lee (SNU)
Abstract: Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism is an ambitious entrerprise that seeks to make sense of our moral discourse as expression of non-cognitive attitudes, while at the same time trying to earn our right to the apparently realistic features of our moral talk. In this paper, I argue that quasi-realism is plagued by a problem which I dub as "the problem of genuine disagreement". Unlike moral realists who regard our moral judgments as expressing beliefs about moral facts that hold independently of us, quasi-realists hardly vindicate our claim that where there is a genuine disagreement, one of the disputants must be wrong. I briefly point out why it constitute a serious problem specifically for quasi-realism. I then consider possible strategies that Blackburn might employ and show why none of them are convincing. If my arguments are right, a quasi-realist should either give up their non-cognitivist approach to morality or concede that there is at least one realist-seeming feature of morality that he cannot justify.
Title: A conservative view as a normative theory on disagreement
Speaker: Heejin Kwon (SNU)
Abstract: I argue for a conservative view as presenting a correct verdict on justification of belief in a peer disagreement circumstance. First of all, I'll display the 'Level-Confusion Argument', which supports that view. Through this argument, I'll point out that any other views than the conservative are subject to the criticism from the level-confusion argument. But those views would be able to avoid that criticism by arguing that they are views trying to bridge different levels. However, I'll show those attempts will not succeed through 'Scope of Subjective Rationality Argument'. Finally, I aim to contend that the 'Equal Weight View' and the 'Total Evidence View' are fallen into the global skepticism by 'Possible Dissents Argument'.
Title: Contextualism, Relativism, and the "Faultless Disagreement"
Speaker: Jeonggyu Lee (SNU)
Abstract: This paper defends contextualism against relativists' 'faultless disagreement' objection, while focusing on the debate about the semantics of predicates of personal taste. Relativists argue that there exists the phenomenon of faultless disagreement, and that relativism is the only framework where we can provide an explanation of this phenomenon. Against this argument, I first suggest three categories of disagreement which are not a faultless disagreement, and I argue that all apparent cases of faultless disagreement belong to one of these three categories. In particular, I argue that the illusion of the existence of faultless disagreement arises when we have not specified the context of conversation in a sufficient way or when we have failed to notice that there is simply a conceptual disagreement.
Title: Kripke's Wittgenstein - reductio ad absurdum and the Picture of Meaning
Speaker: Junyeol Kim (SNU)
Abstract: There is a fundamental question regarding the skeptical solution (SS) of Kripke's Wittgenstein (KW). In what sense is KW's SS skeptical? There have been two answers: The standard view and Wilson's view. The standard view argues that SS is skeptical in the sense that it approves the skeptical conclusion addressed by the skeptic KW describes. On the contrary, Wilson claims that KW never accepts the skeptical conclusion, and SS is skeptical only in the polemical sense that it comes from the consideration of the skeptical argument: According to Wilson, KW actually presents us with a reductio ad absurdum. What puzzles us is that the text of KW seems to corroborate both of the two contradiction views. In this paper, I will reconcile the two views, and thereby, attempt to understand KW in a unified and coherent way.
Graduate Student Workshop
Date: Friday January 27, 2012.
Schedule:
Title: On A Nihilistic Approach Towards Physical Objects.
Speaker: Keehyuk Nahm (Sungkyunkwan University).
Abstract: Any position for a given issue that is nihilistic is one that denies the subject matter itself exists. For instance, nihilism on personal identity would be a position that says we do not exist, while nihilism on physical objects would be one that says physical objects do not exist. In this manner, any kind of nihilism is an ontological claim. For apparent reasons, it is usually among the most extreme of its rival theories of that issue. And because of this tendency, it is commonly considered to be a very absurd position. In this paper, I will argue that its main motivations are not as absurd as they seem. In doing so, I will look into how the problem of identity across time is applied to physical objects. And I will argue that, regardless of any theory of identity, the way we individuate objects are at the center of the problem.
Title: The Tension between Stanley's Semantic theory and His Theory of Knowledge.
Speaker: Junyeol Kim.
Abstract: In this presentation, I will show that there is a serious tension between Jason Stanley's semantic theory and his theory of knowledge. In his semantic theory, he strongly argues that a successful semantic theory should properly explain the phenomenology of competent speakers. However, his interest-relative invariantism about knowledge definitely does not conform to the phenomenology revealed by our uses of the verb "know". This seems to be a serious threat to his theory of knowledge. However, astonishingly, he accepts that his theory of knowledge is more or less isolated from our phenomenology. He tries to evade the threat by saying that his theory is the metaphysical one, not the semantic one. However, it is very doubtful whether this kind of distinction can work. Considering his truth-conditional semantics, it is rather natural for him to say that a semantic theory has metaphysical entailments while a metaphysical theory entails semantic consequences, and so, his theory of knowledge also entails semantic entailments. If so, it is clear that there is a serious tension between his theory of knowledge and meaning. In his theory of meaning, he asserts that semantic theory must conform to our phenomenology, while, in his theory of knowledge, he allows his theory to be isolated from it.
Graduate Student Workshop
Date: Tuesday, November 22, 2011.
Schedule:
Title: Referential Definite Descriptions: the Nominal and Rigidity
Speaker: Chulmin Yoon (Sungkyunkwan University).
Abstract: In this paper, assuming that definite descriptions (of the form "the F") are semantically ambiguous, I discuss the two relevant issues: (i) the role of the nominal ("F" in "the F") and (ii) rigidity of referential definite descriptions. Concerning the role of the nominal, after discussing three possible approaches to the nominal's role, I conclude that the "filter approach" (following Pupa's (2008) terminology) would be the best option. Concerning rigidity, following Wettstein (1983) and Pupa (2008), I claim that referential definite descriptions are rigid designators.
Title: On Systematic Semantics.
Speaker: Junyeol Kim (Seoul National University).
Abstract: In this presentation, I want to draw a picture of systematic semantics. The picture is hinted, not addressed, by Grice's explanation about conversational implicatures. The picture strongly suggests that meaning is just a theoretical entity and that there is no distinction between semantics and pragmatics without a successful semantic theory. Then, I will present an argument for the picture. The argument will start from the consideration about the data of semantics handled in the current debates.
Date: Tuesday November 6, 2012.
Schedule:
| 14.00 - 14.30 | Refreshments | |
| 14.30 - 16.00 | Heejin Kwon (Seoul National University): Criticisms against internalists' intuition |
|
| 16.00 - 16.30 | Break | |
| 16.30 - 18.00 | Junyeol Kim (Seoul National University): A Critique of Interest-Relative Invariantism. |
Title: Criticisms against internalists' intuition
Speaker: Heejin Kwon (Seoul National University)
Abstract: In this paper, I will criticize the intuition that higher-order belief about justification of first-order belief can directly revise first-order belief. For the purpose of this, I will explain the process of this revision and show that there should be an assumption (General Assumption of Access to the Justification of Belief) in order for first-order belief to receive the normative pressure from higher-order belief. This is because higher-order belief about the justificatory status of first-order belief tells nothing about its objective status. Therefore, first-order belief does not have to be revised without the assumption, which connects two kinds of beliefs. In the course of argument, I criticize deontological conception of justification and contend that subjective justification cannot play a role to revise belief.
Title: A Critique of Interest-Relative Invariantism.
Speaker: Junyeol Kim (Seoul National University).
Abstract: In this paper, I will criticize Stanley's Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI) that knowledge partly depends on the practical interests of the subject of the knowledge. My points are two. First, IRI requires not only metaphysical ground but also semantic ground. However, Stanley seems to fail in providing both grounds. Second, the intuitions about knowledge-ascriptions that have triggered IRI do not have serious epistemic bearing. I will show that the intuitions are rather related to our overall rationality. If these are correct, Stanley's IRI suffers for the lack of ground.
Graduate Student Workshop
Date: Monday July 30, 2012.
Schedule:
| 14.00 - 14.30 | Refreshments | |
| 14.30 - 16.00 | Yong Sung Bong (Seoul National University): Does Superassertibility Satisfy the Equivalence Schema? |
|
| 16.00 - 16.30 | Break | |
| 16.30 - 18.00 | Luke Malik (Osaka University): Outline of a Psychical Logic. |
Title: Does Superassertibility Satisfy the Equivalence Schema?
Speaker: Yong Sung Bong (Seoul National University).
Abstract: Crispin Wright, in Truth and Objectivity, argues that superassertibility is an adequate truth property for anti-realist's discourses. According to him, any property F is a truth property if and only if F satisfies equivalence schema. That is, he argues that a following schema holds a priori in anti-realist discourses: (ES) it is superassetible that p if and only if p. Thus he should prove that (ES) holds a priori in every anti-realist discourse. He actually presents two alleged proofs. But, in this paper, I shall argue that his two attempted proofs are unsuccessful. One of two alleged proofs can be proved by classical logic not by intuitionistic logic. However, there is a reason for Wright to use intuitionistic logic instead of classical logic, so this alleged proof cannot be successful. Another alleged proof is circular, so this also cannot be successful. Since his goal in Truth and Objectivity is to reshape realism/anti-realism debate and superassertibility as a truth property for any anti-realist discourses is a necessary element for completing his goal, if superassertibility, as I claim, cannot satisfy equivalence schema, his whole project would be collapsed.
Title: Outline of a Psychical Logic.
Speaker: Luke Malik (Osaka University).
Abstract: If a dualist is to be believed, then there are two kinds of phenomenon in the world: the physical and the psychical. We can consider these distinct in the sense that no equality relations exist between phenomenon of the two kinds. If we accept this, we might expect two distinct sets of statements: a physical set describing the physical equality relations and corresponding modalities and a psychical set describing psychical equality relations and corresponding modalities. Given we have two distinct types of statements we might accept two distinct languages. Sentences in a physicalist language will relate phenomenon physically in accordance with physicalist identities. Sentences in a psychical language will relate phenomenon psychically in accordance with psychical identities. While it may be somewhat clear what the structures and propositions of a physicalist language look like, not only to the physicalist but to the dualist, it may not be clear what the structures and propositions of a psychical language should look like. It is the aim of this paper to appropriate the structures of modal logic to show what the structure and propositions of a psychical language may look like and what conclusions may be drawn, thereof.
Graduate Conference
Date: May 5-6, 2012.
Venue: Yonsei International Campus.
Keynote speakers: Prof. Michael Lynch (University of Connecticut, Storrs) and Prof. Takashi Yagisawa (California State University, Northridge).
Conference page
Graduate Student Workshop
Date: Saturday March 24, 2012.
Schedule:
| 10.00 - 10.30 | Refreshments | |
| 10.30 - 12.00 | Wooram Lee (SNU): Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Genuine Disagreement |
|
| 12.00 - 13.00 | Lunch | |
| 13.00 - 14.30 | Heejin Kwon (SNU): A conservative view as a normative theory on disagreement |
|
| 14.45 - 16.15 | Jeonggyu Lee (SNU): Contextualism, Relativism, and the "Faultless Disagreement" |
|
| 16.15 - 16.45 | Coffee break | |
| 16.45 - 18.15 | Junyeol Kim (SNU): Kripke's Wittgenstein - reductio ad absurdum and the Picture of Meaning |
Title: Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Genuine Disagreement
Speaker: Wooram Lee (SNU)
Abstract: Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism is an ambitious entrerprise that seeks to make sense of our moral discourse as expression of non-cognitive attitudes, while at the same time trying to earn our right to the apparently realistic features of our moral talk. In this paper, I argue that quasi-realism is plagued by a problem which I dub as "the problem of genuine disagreement". Unlike moral realists who regard our moral judgments as expressing beliefs about moral facts that hold independently of us, quasi-realists hardly vindicate our claim that where there is a genuine disagreement, one of the disputants must be wrong. I briefly point out why it constitute a serious problem specifically for quasi-realism. I then consider possible strategies that Blackburn might employ and show why none of them are convincing. If my arguments are right, a quasi-realist should either give up their non-cognitivist approach to morality or concede that there is at least one realist-seeming feature of morality that he cannot justify.
Title: A conservative view as a normative theory on disagreement
Speaker: Heejin Kwon (SNU)
Abstract: I argue for a conservative view as presenting a correct verdict on justification of belief in a peer disagreement circumstance. First of all, I'll display the 'Level-Confusion Argument', which supports that view. Through this argument, I'll point out that any other views than the conservative are subject to the criticism from the level-confusion argument. But those views would be able to avoid that criticism by arguing that they are views trying to bridge different levels. However, I'll show those attempts will not succeed through 'Scope of Subjective Rationality Argument'. Finally, I aim to contend that the 'Equal Weight View' and the 'Total Evidence View' are fallen into the global skepticism by 'Possible Dissents Argument'.
Title: Contextualism, Relativism, and the "Faultless Disagreement"
Speaker: Jeonggyu Lee (SNU)
Abstract: This paper defends contextualism against relativists' 'faultless disagreement' objection, while focusing on the debate about the semantics of predicates of personal taste. Relativists argue that there exists the phenomenon of faultless disagreement, and that relativism is the only framework where we can provide an explanation of this phenomenon. Against this argument, I first suggest three categories of disagreement which are not a faultless disagreement, and I argue that all apparent cases of faultless disagreement belong to one of these three categories. In particular, I argue that the illusion of the existence of faultless disagreement arises when we have not specified the context of conversation in a sufficient way or when we have failed to notice that there is simply a conceptual disagreement.
Title: Kripke's Wittgenstein - reductio ad absurdum and the Picture of Meaning
Speaker: Junyeol Kim (SNU)
Abstract: There is a fundamental question regarding the skeptical solution (SS) of Kripke's Wittgenstein (KW). In what sense is KW's SS skeptical? There have been two answers: The standard view and Wilson's view. The standard view argues that SS is skeptical in the sense that it approves the skeptical conclusion addressed by the skeptic KW describes. On the contrary, Wilson claims that KW never accepts the skeptical conclusion, and SS is skeptical only in the polemical sense that it comes from the consideration of the skeptical argument: According to Wilson, KW actually presents us with a reductio ad absurdum. What puzzles us is that the text of KW seems to corroborate both of the two contradiction views. In this paper, I will reconcile the two views, and thereby, attempt to understand KW in a unified and coherent way.
Graduate Student Workshop
Date: Friday January 27, 2012.
Schedule:
| 14.00 - 14.30 | Coffee | |
| 14.30 - 16.00 | Keehyuk Nahm (Sungkyunkwan University): On A Nihilistic Approach Towards Physical Objects |
|
| 16.00 - 16.30 | Break | |
| 16.30 - 18.00 | Junyeol Kim (Seoul National University): The Tension between Stanley's Semantic theory and His Theory of Knowledge. |
Title: On A Nihilistic Approach Towards Physical Objects.
Speaker: Keehyuk Nahm (Sungkyunkwan University).
Abstract: Any position for a given issue that is nihilistic is one that denies the subject matter itself exists. For instance, nihilism on personal identity would be a position that says we do not exist, while nihilism on physical objects would be one that says physical objects do not exist. In this manner, any kind of nihilism is an ontological claim. For apparent reasons, it is usually among the most extreme of its rival theories of that issue. And because of this tendency, it is commonly considered to be a very absurd position. In this paper, I will argue that its main motivations are not as absurd as they seem. In doing so, I will look into how the problem of identity across time is applied to physical objects. And I will argue that, regardless of any theory of identity, the way we individuate objects are at the center of the problem.
Title: The Tension between Stanley's Semantic theory and His Theory of Knowledge.
Speaker: Junyeol Kim.
Abstract: In this presentation, I will show that there is a serious tension between Jason Stanley's semantic theory and his theory of knowledge. In his semantic theory, he strongly argues that a successful semantic theory should properly explain the phenomenology of competent speakers. However, his interest-relative invariantism about knowledge definitely does not conform to the phenomenology revealed by our uses of the verb "know". This seems to be a serious threat to his theory of knowledge. However, astonishingly, he accepts that his theory of knowledge is more or less isolated from our phenomenology. He tries to evade the threat by saying that his theory is the metaphysical one, not the semantic one. However, it is very doubtful whether this kind of distinction can work. Considering his truth-conditional semantics, it is rather natural for him to say that a semantic theory has metaphysical entailments while a metaphysical theory entails semantic consequences, and so, his theory of knowledge also entails semantic entailments. If so, it is clear that there is a serious tension between his theory of knowledge and meaning. In his theory of meaning, he asserts that semantic theory must conform to our phenomenology, while, in his theory of knowledge, he allows his theory to be isolated from it.
Graduate Student Workshop
Date: Tuesday, November 22, 2011.
Schedule:
| 14.00 - 15.00 | Self-introductions by participants | |
| 15.10 - 16.20 | Chulmin Yoon (Sungkyunkwan University): Referential Definite Descriptions: the Nominal and Rigidity | |
| 16.20 - 16.50 | Coffee | |
| 16.50 - 18.00 | Junyeol Kim (Seoul National University): On Systematic Semantics |
Title: Referential Definite Descriptions: the Nominal and Rigidity
Speaker: Chulmin Yoon (Sungkyunkwan University).
Abstract: In this paper, assuming that definite descriptions (of the form "the F") are semantically ambiguous, I discuss the two relevant issues: (i) the role of the nominal ("F" in "the F") and (ii) rigidity of referential definite descriptions. Concerning the role of the nominal, after discussing three possible approaches to the nominal's role, I conclude that the "filter approach" (following Pupa's (2008) terminology) would be the best option. Concerning rigidity, following Wettstein (1983) and Pupa (2008), I claim that referential definite descriptions are rigid designators.
Title: On Systematic Semantics.
Speaker: Junyeol Kim (Seoul National University).
Abstract: In this presentation, I want to draw a picture of systematic semantics. The picture is hinted, not addressed, by Grice's explanation about conversational implicatures. The picture strongly suggests that meaning is just a theoretical entity and that there is no distinction between semantics and pragmatics without a successful semantic theory. Then, I will present an argument for the picture. The argument will start from the consideration about the data of semantics handled in the current debates.