AOS: Epistemology, truth, metaphysics.

AOC: Formal logic, philosophy of logic and mathematics.


Work in progress:

5*. Pluralist epistemic consequentialism. Committed.

4*. TRUTH and being true. Committed.

3*. Epistemic peer disagreement. To appear in Fricker, Graham, Henderson, Pedersen, and Wyatt (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology.

2*. Pure epistemic pluralism. Committed.

1*. Pluralist consequentialist anti-scepticism. To appear in P. Graham and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Edited collections:

E. (with A. Coliva) Epistemic Pluralism.

D. (with M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, and J. Wyatt) The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Under contract with Routledge.

C. (with P. Graham) Epistemic Entitlement. To appear with Oxford University Press.

B. (with Cory D. Wright). (2013). Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. New York: Oxford University Press.(OUP USA, OUP UK.)

A. (with Cory D. Wright). (2010). New Waves in Truth. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (Palgrave Macmillan, amazon.)

Journal articles, volume chapters, encyclopedia entries:

22. (with M. P. Lynch) Truth Pluralism. To appear in M. Glanzberg (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Truth.

21. Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism. Forthcoming in Synthese. (Journal link (Online First))

20. (2016). Hume's Principle and entitlement: on the epistemology of the neo-Fregean programme. In P. Ebert and M. Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics (185-201). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Preprint)

19. (with J. C. Bjerring) (2014). All the (Many, Many) Things We Know: Extended Knowledge? Philosophical Issues, 24: 24-38

18. (with J. C. Bjerring and J. U. Hansen). (2014). On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Synthese, 191: 2445-2470. (Preprint - Published version)

17. (2014). Pluralism x 3: truth, logic, metaphysics. Erkenntnis, 79: 259--277. (A special issue on logical monism, pluralism, and relativism edited by D. Cohnitz, P. Pagin, and M. Rossberg.) (Journal link)

16. (with J. Kallestrup). (2013). The epistemology of absence-based inference. Synthese, 190: 2573-2593. (Preprint - Published version)

15. (with K. Ahlstrom and K. Kappel). (2013). The epistemology of inclusiveness. Synthese, 190: 1185-1188. (Published version)

14. (with C. D. Wright). (2013). Introduction. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (10-38). New York: Oxford University Press. (Preprint)

13. (with C. D. Wright). (2013). Pluralism about truth as alethic disjunctivism. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (87-112). New York: Oxford University Press. (Preprint)

12. (2012). Recent work on alethic pluralism. Analysis, 72: 588-607. (Preprint - Published version)

11. (with C. D. Wright). (2012). Pluralist theories of truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

10. (2012). True alethic functionalism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20: 125-133. (Symposium on Lynch's Truth as One and Many). (Preprint - Published version)

9. (with D. Edwards). (2011). Truth as One(s) and Many: on Lynch's alethic functionalism. Analytic Philosophy, 52: 213-230. (Preprint - Published version)

8. (with C. Kelp). (2010). Second-order knowledge. In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (586-596). London: Routledge. (Preprint)

7. (with C. D. Wright). (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In C. D. Wright and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth (205-217). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). (Preprint)

6. (with M. Rossberg). (2010). Open-endedness, schemas and ontological commitment. In Noûs, 44: 329-339. (Preprint - Published version)

5. (2010). Stabilizing alethic pluralism. Philosophical Quarterly, 60: 92-108. (Preprint - Published version)

4. (2009). Solving the Caesar Problem without categorical sortals. Erkenntnis, 71: 141-155. (Preprint - Published version)

3. (2009). Entitlement, value and rationality. Synthese, 171: 443-457. (A special issue on the philosophy of Crispin Wright edited by J. Kallestrup and D. Pritchard. Preprint - Published version)

2. (2006). What can the problem of mixed inferences teach us about alethic pluralism? The Monist, 89: 103-117. (Preprint Abstract in The Review of Metaphysics, 59, 2005.)

1. (2006). Entitlements, good and bad. Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 7: 58-82. (Preprint)

Conference proceedings and newsletters:

d. From metaphysical pluralism to alethic pluralism? In Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy 39 (201–208). Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center.

c. (with Marcus Rossberg) "McGee on Open-ended Schemas", accepted for publication in H. Bohse et al. (eds.): Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.6, Sixth International Congress of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy (Paderbon: mentis).

b. "Entitlement in mathematics", in MATHNET 12: Newsletter of the Danish Network for the History and Philosophy of Mathematics.

a. "Considerations on neo-Fregean ontology" , pp. 504-511 in R. Bluhm and C. Nimtz (eds.): Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.5, Fifth International Congress of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy (Paderbon: mentis), 2004.