Research

AOS: Epistemology, truth, metaphysics.

AOC: Formal logic, philosophy of logic and mathematics.


Publications

Work in progress:

9*. True Pluralism: The Ways of Truth. Monograph. (Co-authors: F. Ferrari and S. Moruzzi)

8*. Article on epistemic relativism. Contribution to a special issue of Inquiry.

7*. Non-evidentialist epistemology, closure, and the question of unity.

6*. Non-evidentialism, disagreement, and epistemic relativism. Contribution to a special issue of Metaphilosophy.>

5*. Extended knowledge overextended? Contribution to Extending knowledge: reflections on epistemic agency and epistemic environment in East-West philosophy, edited by K. Lai, Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring)

4*. The problem of mixed beings. Contribution to a symposium on Kris McDaniel’s The Fragmentation of Being.

3*. Grounding manifestation pluralism.

2*. Grounding determination pluralism.

1*. The return of the many. Under review. (Co-author: S. Kim)


Edited collections:

G. (2020). Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Under contract with Brill. (Co-editor: L. Moretti)

F. (2020). Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Co-editor: P. Graham) (OUP, amazon.)

E. (2019). The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. (Co-editors: M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson) (Routledge, amazon.)

D. (2018). Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editors: N. Kellen and J. Wyatt) (Palgrave Macmillan, amazon.)

C. (2017). Epistemic Pluralism. London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editor: A. Coliva) (Palgrave Macmillan, amazon.)

B. (2013). Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. New York: Oxford University Press.(Co-editor: Cory D. Wright) (OUP USA, OUP UK.)

A. (2010). New Waves in Truth. London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editor: Cory D. Wright) (Palgrave Macmillan, amazon.)


Journal articles, volume chapters, encyclopedia entries:

38. (202X). On moderate pluralism about truth and logic. To appear in Philosophical Forum.

37. (202X). The paradox of conceptualizability. To appear in Philosophia.

36. (2020). Cornerstone epistemology: scepticism, mathematics, non-evidentialism, consequentialism, pluralism. To appear in N. J. L. L. Pedersen & L. Moretti (eds.): Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill.

35. (2020). Introduction. To appear in N. J. L. L. Pedersen & L. Moretti (eds.): Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill. (Co-author: Luca Moretti.)

34. (2020). Austere truth pluralism. To appear in Lynch, Wyatt, Kim, and Kellen (eds.): The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Co-authors: F. Ferrari and S. Moruzzi) (Preprint)

33. (2020). Moderate truth pluralism and the structure of doxastic normativity. To appear in American Philosophical Quarterly, 57(4). (Preprint)

32. (2020). Recent work on epistemic entitlement. To appear in American Philosophical Quarterly, 57(2). (Co-author: P. Graham) (Preprint)

31. (2020). On the normative variability of truth and logic. To appear in Inquiry. (Preprint - Journal)

30. (2020). Pluralist consequentialist anti-scepticism. To appear in P. Graham and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Preprint)

29. (2020). Introduction and Overview: Two Entitlement Projects. In P. Graham and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Co-authors: P. Graham, Z. Bachman, and L. Rosa) (Preprint)

28. (2019). Epistemic peer disagreement. To appear in Fricker, Graham, Henderson, and Pedersen (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. (Co-author: F. Ferrari) (Preprint)

27. (2019). Introduction. To appear in Fricker, Graham, Henderson, and Pedersen (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. (Co-author: M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson)

26. (2018). Strong truth pluralism. In J. Wyatt, N. J. L. L. Pedersen and N. Kellen (eds.): Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-author: S. Kim) (Preprint - Palgrave Macmillan)

25. (2018). Introduction. In J. Wyatt, N. J. L. L. Pedersen and N. Kellen (eds.): Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-authors: J. Wyatt and N. Kellen) (Preprint - Palgrave Macmillan)

24. (2018). Truth Pluralism. In M. Glanzberg (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Truth (543-575). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: M. P. Lynch) (Preprint)

23. (2018). Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism. Synthese, 195: 2935-2966. (Preprint - Published version)

22. (2017). Pure epistemic pluralism. In A. Coliva and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism (47-92). London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Preprint - Palgrave Macmillan)

21. (2017). Introduction. In A. Coliva and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism (1-19). London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-author: A. Coliva) (Preprint - Google Books)

20. (2016). Hume's Principle and entitlement: on the epistemology of the neo-Fregean programme. In P. Ebert and M. Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics (185-201). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Preprint - Oxford Scholarship Online)

19. (2014). All the (Many, Many) Things We Know: Extended Knowledge? Philosophical Issues, 24: 24-38. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring) (Preprint - Published version)

18. (2014). On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Synthese, 191: 2445-2470. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring and J. U. Hansen) (Preprint - Published version)

17. (2014). Pluralism x 3: truth, logic, metaphysics. Erkenntnis, 79: 259--277. (A special issue on logical monism, pluralism, and relativism edited by D. Cohnitz, P. Pagin, and M. Rossberg.) (Preprint - Published version)

16. (2013). The epistemology of absence-based inference. Synthese, 190: 2573-2593. (Co-author: J. Kallestrup) (Preprint - Published version)

15. (2013). The epistemology of inclusiveness. Synthese, 190: 1185-1188. (Co-authors: K. Ahlstrom-Vij, K. Kappel) (Published version)

14. (2013). Introduction. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (10-38). New York: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint - Google Books)

13. (2013). Pluralism about truth as alethic disjunctivism. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (87-112). New York: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint - Google Books)

12. (2012). Recent work on alethic pluralism. Analysis, 72: 588-607. (Preprint - Published version)

11. (2012). Pluralist theories of truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright)

10. (2012). True alethic functionalism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20: 125-133. (Symposium on Lynch's Truth as One and Many). (Preprint - Published version)

9. (2011). Truth as One(s) and Many: on Lynch's alethic functionalism. Analytic Philosophy, 52: 213-230. (Co-author: D. Edwards) (Preprint - Published version)

8. (2010). Second-order knowledge. In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (586-596). London: Routledge. (Co-author: C. Kelp) (Preprint - Routledge)

7. (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In C. D. Wright and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth (205-217). London: Palgrave Macmillan). (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint - Palgrave Macmillan)

6. ((2010). Open-endedness, schemas and ontological commitment. In Noûs, 44: 329-339. (Co-author: M. Rossberg) (Preprint - Published version)

5. (2010). Stabilizing alethic pluralism. Philosophical Quarterly, 60: 92-108. (Preprint - Published version)

4. (2009). Solving the Caesar Problem without categorical sortals. Erkenntnis, 71: 141-155. (Preprint - Published version)

3. (2009). Entitlement, value and rationality. Synthese, 171: 443-457. (A special issue on the philosophy of Crispin Wright edited by J. Kallestrup and D. Pritchard. Preprint - Published version)

2. (2006). What can the problem of mixed inferences teach us about alethic pluralism? The Monist, 89: 103-117. (Preprint - Published version)

1. (2006). Entitlements, good and bad. Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 7: 58-82. (Preprint - Published version)


Conference proceedings and newsletters:

d. From metaphysical pluralism to alethic pluralism? In Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy 39 (201-208). Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center.

c. (with Marcus Rossberg) "McGee on Open-ended Schemas", accepted for publication in H. Bohse et al. (eds.): Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.6, Sixth International Congress of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy (Paderbon: mentis).

b. "Entitlement in mathematics", in MATHNET 12: Newsletter of the Danish Network for the History and Philosophy of Mathematics.

a. "Considerations on neo-Fregean ontology" , pp. 504-511 in R. Bluhm and C. Nimtz (eds.): Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.5, Fifth International Congress of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy (Paderbon: mentis), 2004.