Introduction

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1. Three debates

The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention in the truth literature and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible one. Another big debate—one of a more recent vintage—concerns the issue whether truth is merely a logical 'device' that finds its use in generalizations and in expressing semantic ascent. Deflationists endorse the idea, whereas inflationists reject it. As deflationism has become increasingly prominent, so has the divide between the two camps and the debate between them. More recently still, a third debate has started to emerge in the truth literature, centered around the issue whether truth is one or many. Put in slightly different terms: is there only one property in virtue of which propositions can be true, or are there several? The truth monist holds the former view, while the truth pluralist adheres to the latter.

Truth pluralism is often associated with Crispin Wright who has expressed sympathy towards the view in a number of writings. Several criticisms have been leveled against pluralism in the literature. Defences have been offered, as have attempts to develop the view further.[1] The literature on truth pluralism has been growing steadily for the past twenty years. This volume, however, is the first of its kind—the first collection of papers focused specifically on pluralism about truth. This is an interesting topic in its own right. Part I of the volume is thus dedicated to the development, investigation, and critical discussion of different forms of pluralism. An additional reason to look at truth pluralism with interest is the significant connections it bears to other debates in the truth literature—the debates concerning traditional theories of truth and the deflationism/inflationism divide being cases in hand. Parts II and III of the volume connect truth pluralism to these two debates. In the next three sections we give a very short overview of the different parts of the volume. The overview highlights only selected aspects of

[1] Wright touches on pluralism in passing in 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, and 2001. Criticisms have been formulated by a wide range of commentators, including Blackburn 1998, Horton & Poston forthcoming, Jackson 1994, Nulty 2010, Pettit 1996, Shapiro 2009, 2011, Sainsbury 1996, Sher 2005, Tappolet 1997, 2000, 2010, Williamson 1994, and Wright 2005, 2010, forthcoming. For defences or attempts to develop the view further, see, .e.g., Beall 2000, Cotnoir 2009, forthcoming, Edwards 2008, 2009, 2011, Kölbel 2008, Lynch 2001, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2009, and Pedersen 2006, 2010.

the individual contributions, and as such, betrays their richness and level of detail. However, our hope is that the reader will come to appreciate these own her own.

2. Varieties of pluralism (Part I)

The core pluralist thesis is that what property makes propositions true may vary across domains, or from subject matter to subject matter. Corresponding with reality might be the alethically potent property—the property that can make propositions true—when it comes to discourse about ordinary, concrete objects. On the other hand, cohering with the axioms of Peano arithmetic and being endorsed most widely might be the relevant property for discourse about respectively arithmetic and the goodness of consumer goods.

Certain issues give rise to divisions within the pluralist camp. In particular, although pluralists agree that several properties are alethically potent, they diverge in their understanding of alethic potency. The issue is how precisely to articulate the thought that different properties can make propositions belonging to different domains true. Suppose that property of being F_i is the property that makes propositions in domain D_i true. Then one way to understand alethic potency is along reductionist lines:

(R_1) In domain D_i, the property of being true is identical to F_i.
(R_2) In domain D_i, the property of being true is constituted by F_i.

Since identity is stronger than constitution, (R_1) is stronger than (R_2). However, given the shared reductionist nature, both (R_1) and (R_2) intimate a very strong link between being true and having one of the alethically potent properties. On either account of alethic potency, there is nothing to being true in a given domain D_i over and above being F_i. This leads to a radical or strong form of pluralism. Truth is many, and just that. There is no overarching unity to truth. This is reflected in the relativization of the identity or constitution thesis that is part of reductionist versions of pluralism: truth-as-such is lost—truth-in-a-domain is what remains.

Strong pluralism is not a position widely held within the pluralist camp. The contributors of Part I of the volume (Michael Lynch, Nikolaj Pedersen & Cory Wright, Douglas Edwards, and Crispin Wright) all advocate a form of moderate pluralism, a position intermediate between strong pluralism and monism.[2] The moderate pluralist grants something to each of the two views by taking truth to be both many and one. Truth is many because different properties make propositions true in different domains, and it is one because all these propositions have something in common, truth-as-such.

What sets moderate and strong pluralists apart is their take on alethic potency. As seen, on the strong pluralist's view, truth-as-such drops out of the picture since there is nothing to truth in each domain over and above the property that is alethically potent within that domain. To preserve the idea that propositions can be true-as-such—and not just true-in-a-domain—the moderate

[2] However, see Max Kölbel's contribution (Chap. 13) for a form of strong pluralism.

pluralist gives a non-reductionist account of alethic potency.[3] The accounts on offer in the contributions to Part I of the volume differ significantly in detail, but can all be regarded as incorporating the idea that alethic potency is a kind of dependence relation. Being true-as-such is a property distinct from—and over and above—the properties that are alethically potent within their respective domains. However, a proposition's being true-as-such depends on its having one of the locally alethically potent properties.

Lynch (Ch. 2) spells out dependence in terms of what he calls "manifestation". A property *F* manifests a property *F** just in case it is a priori that the set of conceptually essential features of *F** is a subset of *F*'s features. One way to think of this is to say that part of being *F* is to be *F**. Applied to the case of truth, Lynch takes alethically potent properties like correspondence (in a suitably naturalized version), super-warrant, and coherence to manifest truth. Truth's conceptually essential features are given by three so-called "core truisms". These say, roughly, that true propositions are objective, correct to believe, and should be aimed at in inquiry. The appeal to the core truisms makes Lynch's proposal functionalist in nature: the core truisms pin down the "truth-role", or the functions that truth has. The properties of corresponding, being super-warranted, and cohering manifest truth because propositions that possess these properties are objective, correct to believe, and should be aimed at in enquiry. To be true is part of what it is to correspond, be super-warranted, and cohere.

Pedersen & Wright (Ch. 5) propose a form of moderate pluralism called "alethic disjunctivism". On this view truth-as-such is a certain disjunctive property, characterized as follows: a proposition is true-as-such just in case it possesses the alethically potent property of domain$_1$ and pertains to domain$_1$, or …, or possesses the alethically potent property of domain$_n$ and pertains to domain$_n$. A proposition's possessing the disjunctive property depends on its having one of the alethically potent properties in the sense that the former is grounded in the latter. Grounding is (strongly) asymmetric, i.e. if *x*'s being *F* grounds *x*'s being *F**, then it is not the case that *x*'s being *F** grounds *x*'s being *F*. For this reason, for alethic disjunctivism, while a proposition is true-as-such because it has the property that is alethically potent within its domain, the converse does not hold. Given this asymmetry between truth as one (truth-as-such) and truth as many (the alethically potent properties), alethic disjunctivism gives metaphysical priority to the many over the one. At the same time, claim Pedersen and Wright, the alethic disjunctivist can maintain a high degree of unity because the disjunctive truth property—the one possessed by all true propositions—satisfies certain core principles. Pedersen and Wright support this claim by arguing that the disjunctive truth property satisfies Lynch's three truisms.

Edwards (Ch. 6) bases his account of dependence on an analogy with winning. Edwards observes that an instance of the following schema holds for games: if one is playing game *x*, then if one possesses property *F*, one has won the game. For example, in the case of chess, the conditional is this: if one is playing

[3] The debate between moderate and strong pluralists over relativization of truth to a domain has some parallels with an older debate between Davidson and followers of Tarski's over the consequences of relativization of truth predicates to a language.

chess, then if one check mates one's opponent, one has won the game. Edwards takes the relationship between the game-specific property and the property of winning to be one of determination. Thus, in the case of chess, check mating one's opponent specifies what it takes to win, and so, having that property determines a win. Transposed to the truth case, Edwards suggests that domains of discourse can be treated as being associated with a certain truth-determining conditional. For example, assuming that corresponding with reality is the alethically potent property for discourse about the material world, the conditional would be: if *p* pertains to the material world, then if *p* corresponds with reality, then *p* is true. Possessing the property of corresponding with reality is what it takes to be true for discourse pertaining to the material world, and so, correspondence determines truth for this kind of discourse.

Wright's *Truth and Objectivity* (1992) is widely cited as one of the works with which pluralism originated. While the book contains passages that mention 'pluralism', the view is not developed in detail. The same applies to Wright's later work (see references in fn. 1). Wright's contribution to this volume (Ch. 7) contains his most extensive and worked out version of pluralism to date.

The starting point of Wright's proposal is a platitude-based approach to the characterization of the concept of truth, just as in (1992) and (2001). This commitment is supplemented by a commitment to moderate pluralism, or the idea that truth is both one and many. In spelling out his view, Wright registers a fundamental agreement with Edwards: the most promising way to think about the relationship between truth-as-such and the multitude of alethically potent properties like correspondence and coherence is to endorse a range of domain-specific "determination conditionals".

However, while Wright agrees with Edwards that there are insights to be gleaned from the analogy between winning and truth—crucially, the domain-specific conditionals—he thinks that the epistemological status of the conditionals is significantly different in the two cases. Both types of conditional rank as conceptual truths. The correctness of any given game conditional "leaps at you" or is obvious. Furthermore, this immediate recognition of correctness seems to be constitutive of knowing what the relevant game is. For instance, it would appear reasonable to doubt that someone knew chess if she were to deny or doubt the correctness of "If one is playing chess, then if one check mates one's opponent, one has won". The same points do not appear to apply to the conditionals in the truth case. For the sake of illustration, suppose that "If *p* pertains to morals, then if *p* is superassertible, then *p* is true" is correct.[4] The correctness of this conditional would not be immediately obvious in the way that the chess conditional is, and it would seem unreasonable to charge someone who did not immediately endorse it with not knowing what morals come to. Against the background of this disanalogy, Wright subjects the domain-specific conditionals to further discussion. The discussion aims to accomplish two things: first, to reconcile the status of the

[4] A statement is superassertible just in case "it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our information.' (Wright 1992, p. 48).

domain-specific conditionals as conceptual necessities with the air of controversiality that surrounds them, and second, to account for how the domain-specific conditionals can do the intended metaphysical work, i.e. how a proposition's possession of the property relevant to its domain makes the proposition true-as-such.

The pluralist contributions just touched on are complemented by critical pieces by Marian David (Ch. 3) and Pascal Engel (Ch. 4). Both contributions target Lynch's functionalist view.

David subjects two of the major components of Lynch's view—functionalism and alethic-potency-as-manifestation—to critical scrutiny. As we have seen above, Lynch's functionalism derives from the idea that the core truisms pin down the truth role, and that truth is to be characterized in terms of this role. David suggests that the Lynch-style functionalist is most naturally understood as operating with an absolute notion of the truth-role, meaning that a property's playing the truth-role requires it to satisfy the core truisms in relation to all (truth-apt) propositions. However, this has the untoward consequence that none of the locally potent properties can play the truth-role (since each of them only satisfies the core truisms for propositions belonging to a specific domain). In light of this David urges the functionalist to relativize the truth-role to individual propositions or to domains.

David likewise thinks that the Lynch-style functionalist has work to do with respect to the other major component of her view: the notion of manifestation. In order for a property *F* to manifest truth-as-such the essential features of truth-as-such must be among *F*'s features. However, truth-as-such has several properties essentially that are not shared by any of the properties supposed to manifest it—e.g., the property of playing the truth-role for all propositions and the property of being identical to truth-as-such. In light of this, contrary to Lynch's own contention, it would appear that correspondence, superwarrant, and so on cannot manifest truth-as-such. David concludes that the notion of manifestation cannot do the work that Lynch intends it to do, but that the functionalist is free to replace it with some other—and better—account of alethic dependence.

Lynch claims that the normativity of truth is straightforwardly accounted for on the manifestation functionalist view: it is an essential feature of truth to be the standard of correctness for belief, and as such, true beliefs are ones that ought be held (all things being equal). Engel critically discusses this aspect of the functionalist position by developing a dilemma: the multiple manifestability of truth does not harmonize with the idea that the normativity of truth is both uniform and substantive. To hold on to multiple manifestability the functionalist has to give up either the uniformity of alethic normativity or its substantiveness. To do the former would be to give up on the idea that there is a single norm of truth that applies across all truth-apt discourse—a part of Lynch's view. Instead, there would be a multitude of local norms. To do the latter would bring the functionalist story close to deflationism in certain respects; yet, the functionalist view is precisely meant to be a polar opposite of deflationism.

3. Truth pluralism, correspondence, and descriptions (Part II)

The core pluralist thesis—that there are several alethically potent properties—gives some credit to traditional theories of truth: any theory that focuses on one of the alethically potent properties gets things right, at least locally. The qualification "at least locally" is important. Traditional theories of truth commit to the monist idea that one and the same property is alethically potent across the board, or within all truth-apt domains of discourse. According to the pluralist, by taking on board this monist commitment traditional theories extend the applicability of their favored property too far. None of the favored properties can plausibly be thought of as applying globally, or within every truth-apt domain of discourse. This issue has become known as the "scope problem" in the literature.[5]

Which among the traditionally prominent theories of truth is the most plausible one? If the scope problem is a compelling one, the extensive debate over this question would appear to rest on the misguided supposition that one theory must get things right across the board. Several contributions of Part I of the volume take the scope problem to motivate a move away from monism and traditional theories of truth (as they incorporate monism) to a pluralist position that accommodates a range of alethically potent properties. The papers by Lynch, Pedersen & Wright, Edwards, and Wright are cases in hand.

However, matters may not be as simple as they seem at first. Gila Sher (Ch. 8) and Robert Barnard & Terence Horgan (Ch. 9) adhere to a version of the correspondence theory, but propose a way to deal with the scope problem. Both papers are premised on the need to account for the diversity of our truth-apt thought—and so, acknowledge the force of the scope problem—but at the same seek to preserve its unity. In their own ways, they do so by suggesting that there are different forms of correspondence. This move results in views that go beyond traditional versions of the correspondence theory, which rest with the reduction of truth to correspondence. According to Sher and Barnard & Horgan, however, there is correspondence, *and* correspondence is a genus that subsumes different species or forms.

The proliferation of correspondence into different forms makes the correspondence views in Part II significantly similar to the kinds of moderate pluralism presented in Part I: on all views truth is both diverse and unified. Moderate pluralists think so because truth is both one and many. There is truth-as-such, but likewise—and importantly—there are several properties that can ground truth-as-such for propositions belonging to different domains. For the correspondence views in Part II, what we have is this: truth is diverse because there are *different* forms of correspondence, and at the same time, truth is unified because they are all forms of *correspondence*.

The moderate pluralist views and the correspondence views of Sher and Barnard & Horgan are also significantly dissimilar. As mentioned earlier, pluralists do not think that traditional monist theories are completely off the mark. They get it right locally, or within certain domains. In this sense pluralists do give some credit to traditional theories of truth. Matters are somewhat different when

[5] The label is used in Lynch 2004. Other labels are used in the literature as well, but the "scope problem" seems to be used most widely.

we consider multitudinous correspondence views. They give much credit to one traditional theory of truth, and one theory only: the correspondence theory. No credit is given to coherence, superassertibility, pragmatic expediency, or any other candidate properties. It is correspondence across the board. However, crucially, as we have seen, different forms of correspondence may hold sway over different domains or subject matters.

Sher (Ch. 8) distinguishes between direct and indirect forms of correspondence. Direct correspondence covers simple cases where language straightforwardly represents reality (e.g., via causal links), while indirect correspondence obtains in cases where the route between the two is more intricate. Sher's methodology is to proceed inductively on a case-by-case basis. Not until a domain has been extensively and thoroughly examined will the exact nature of correspondence for that domain be known. Thus, further and more fine-grained distinctions may be drawn under the umbrella of respectively direct and indirect correspondence—only careful examination of specific domains will show how many and how diverse subdivisions of the two forms of correspondence are.

Consonant with her favored methodology, Sher's contribution contains an investigation into the nature of correspondence for the specific domain of mathematics. Very roughly, Sher takes mathematics to be concerned with certain kinds of formal properties of reality (i.e., the properties that are invariant under isomorphism, such as identity). She restricts attention to basic arithmetic, taking cardinal numbers to be certain 2nd-level properties (i.e., properties of properties). The standard formulation of arithmetic is first-order, meaning that numerals—the linguistic expressions meant to denote numbers—are treated as singular terms, i.e. a type of expression that usually refers to individuals. Subsequently, Sher proposes that we think of arithmetical truth in terms of indirect rather than direct correspondence. The world contains no numbers at the level of individuals, and so, there is no way for arithmetical statements—with their ingredient singular terms—directly to correspond to reality. However, since mathematics is a human activity, and since it is cognitively more straightforward to engage in reasoning about individuals and their properties, human cognizers posit individuals and 1st-level properties when doing arithmetic. These posited entities represent the arithmetical features of the world. Given the vital representative role played by the intermediate entities we are dealing with an indirect form of correspondence—an illustration of how, for some domains, the route from thought to reality is quite intricate.

Like Sher, Barnard & Horgan (Ch. 9) draw a distinction between direct and indirect correspondence. For them, both forms of correspondence are "ideologically mediated" relations between language and the world, and different domains of discourse will involve different ideological commitments or posits. These are elements of language and thought. While posits often figure in language or thought whose surface grammar is existentially committing, only some posits correlate with entities or properties that really exist or are part of the ultimate ontology. When language maps entities and properties in the ultimate ontology, the relevant kind of correspondence is direct. In other cases the relevant kind of correspondence is indirect.

For the sake of illustration, consider Barnard & Horgan's example where we suppose that the ultimate ontology contains many trees, but just that. In that case, the statement "There are trees" directly corresponds to the world: the relevant posit—the lexeme *tree*—maps something in the ultimate ontology. On the other hand, "There exist forests" does not correspond in a direct way because the relevant posit—the lexeme *forest*—does not map something in the ultimate ontology. Nonetheless, the statement is true in virtue of indirectly corresponding to the world. The semantic standards operative for discourse about trees and forests are such that "There are trees" mediates between language and a world in which trees are within close proximity of each other.

Barnard & Horgan grant minimal realism as a background assumption for their correspondence view. (Let minimal realism be the thesis that there is a world and that it has a definite nature.) Beyond this minimal realism they maintain that the correspondence view ought to be metaphysically neutral: being a correspondence theorist should be compatible with being a "Parmenidean monist, or materialist, or Platonist, or Cartesian dualist, or whatever" (p. ???).

In his contribution to the volume, Richard Fumerton (Ch. 10) argues that, in several respects, the correspondence theory might be more accommodating or flexible than often thought. First, continuing the thread of metaphysical neutrality, Fumerton suggests that the correspondence theory is compatible with not just realism of various stripes, but likewise with anti-realism of different kinds (including idealism). Second, the correspondence theory can allow for degrees of truth. He rehearses the claim that the correspondence relation works very much in the way pictures do, as representations; and just as pictures are naturally thought of as being more or less accurate representations of what they depict, it is natural to think of truth bearers as representing or corresponding to reality to a higher or lower degree. Third, the correspondence theory can accommodate a kind of relativism in the sense that there can be alternative equally correct descriptions of reality. Just as different pictures can succeed in representing the same thing, different descriptions or conceptualizations can correspond equally well to reality. Considering two descriptions q_1 and q_2, one description might include a truth not included in the other. However, Fumerton maintains that, while p might be true in q_1 and not be included in q_2, the reason is never that not-p is true in q_2. Equally correct descriptions of the world are always compatible. Furthermore, they can always be conjoined into one big description of what the world is like. Fourth, considering the pluralist idea that there are different truth properties $F_1, \ldots, F_n$ (coherence, utility of belief, etc.), Fumerton goes on to argue that the only way to make sense of $F_1, \ldots, F_n$ is to understand these properties in terms of correspondence. The effect of doing so, however, would be to deprive pluralism of much of the initial plausibility it might be thought to possess (due to, e.g., the scope problem). Ultimately, Fumerton reverts to a neo-classical view of correspondence as the only viable way to think about truth.

For his part, Wolfram Hinzen (Ch. 11) takes an approach radically different from any correspondence approach to truth. Hinzen proposes a (methodologically) naturalistic inquiry into truth, which eschews the metaphysical approach of developing grand alethic stories about the nature and constitution of truth independent of the cognitive creatures who conceptualize of it. While

Hinzen endorses a kind of naturalism that is widely regarded as being one of the chief motivations for adopting some version of the correspondence theory, he thinks that the theory goes wrong by treating truth in an externalist fashion—as having a source that is external to language and mind. He develops a novel view that pulls in the opposite direction: truth emerges as a product of the mental organization of human beings, and so, naturalistic studies into its nature must be directed inwards or take as their focus the internal structure of our mind and language.

Hinzen's view has mixed consequences for all three major kinds of conceptions: traditionalist, deflationist, and pluralist. With respect to pluralism, he aims his criticisms at both the main consideration in its favor—namely, the scope problem—and the view itself. The scope problem says that no uniform treatment can plausibly be given of truth across all truth-apt domains of discourse. Reminiscent of Sher's view about the indirect correspondence of first-order arithmetic and mathematics as a cognitive activity, Hinzen also counters by arguing that moral properties are part of moral cognition and mutatis mutandis for other domain-specific properties and types of cognition. But these kinds of cognition are all activities of mind and as natural as mind itself. Since truth is rooted in the internal structure of mind and language, truth across all domains emerges as having an internalist-naturalistic nature. And it does so in a domain-general way, argues Hinzen, analogous to sense in which language is domain-general. Hinzen does take seriously the idea that there may be disunification in what might be called the 'alethic mode of cognition' (Sher & Wright, 2007), given the inherent structure of human language and the role that our concept of it plays in human cognition, does resonate with both pluralists and Hinzen. But while he considers the pluralist intuition that there is considerable variation when comparing discourse across domains, he is unable to trace this variation to anything more than differences in the conceptual structure in domains of human cognition. Thus, contra the pluralist, domain-related variation is not a natural indicator of alethic variation.

Dorothy Grover (Ch. 12) has long been one of the foremost exponents of prosententialism, which is a radical form of deflationism and which is incompatible with the key pluralist idea that there is a multitude of substantive properties that are alethically potent within specific domains. Grover is also therefore a detractor of truth pluralism, so construed. However, Grover also engages with the issue of truth pluralism from the alternative route of descriptions: is there more than one true way of describing the world? The pluralist about descriptions answers in the affirmative, the monist in the negative.

Grover rightly points out that the question of pluralism must be supplemented by a specification of what kind of description is relevant to answering the question. She doubts the coherence of the notion of a complete description of the world, and thinks that the question can only be interestingly asked when the relevant kind of descriptions of the world are not required to be complete. Against this background, and perhaps consonant with Fumerton's view (were he a prosententialist), Grover develops a perspectivalist view according to which different incomplete descriptions of the world provide a multitude of perspectives that are needed for rational decision-making. She argues that her

perspectivalism supports what Lynch (1998) refers to as "vertical pluralism", or the thesis that there are different kinds of non-reductive facts (e.g. moral facts and mathematical facts, neither of which are reducible to the other). She then explores the issue whether her perspectivalism likewise supports "horizontal pluralism" (again in the sense of Lynch (1998)), a more radical form of pluralism according to which there can be incompatible facts within the same discourse. For example, according to this kind of pluralism, it is possible for there to be incompatible moral facts. Grover rejects Lynch's own attempt to support horizontal pluralism, and does not think that considerations from Quine on distinct empirically equivalent systems suffice either. She identifies the existence of two genuinely irreconcilable, fact-stating languages as something that would support horizontal pluralism. However, she leaves open the question whether there are indeed two languages of this kind.

4. Truth pluralism, deflationism, and paradox (Part III)

As we have seen in the previous section, truth pluralism connects with the correspondence theory—and cognate themes such as descriptions—in significant and interesting ways. The same can be said about truth pluralism and the debate between inflationists and deflationists. To see this we note that there is a fundamental methodological point of convergence between deflationists and pluralists. Both camps approach the task of characterizing the concept of truth by laying down certain basic principles that capture its functions.

The deflationist maintains that there is a small set of principles that completely characterize the concept of truth, the favored principle being the disquotational schema ('*p*' is true if, and only if, *p*) or some similar principle.[6] Such *T*-schemata enable truth predicates to serve as a vehicle of generalization, semantic ascent, and certain other logical or expressive functions. According to the deflationist, there is nothing else to say about truth other than what truth predicates do (which is not much).

Like the deflationist, pluralists take the concept of truth to be characterized by certain fundamental principles that capture its functions. This is the approach taken by Lynch, Pedersen & Wright, Edwards, and Wright in Part I of the volume. Unlike the deflationist, however, pluralists think that it takes more than one principle to fully to characterize the concept of truth. They agree with the deflationist that the disquotational schema (or some similar principle) must be part of any adequate characterization, but also deny that such a schema exhausts what can be said and endorse a number of additional principles that inflate truth beyond what the deflationist is willing to accept.

Simon Blackburn (Ch. 13) discusses deflationism, pluralism, expressivism, and pragmatism. First he turns to deflationism and pluralism. The pluralist claims that differences in domains track differences in truth. In Blackburn's view, it is clear what the deflationist ought to say in response to this claim: the pluralist is

[6] Like the equivalence schema (⟨*p*⟩ is true if, and only if, *p*) or the operator schema (it is true that *p* if, and only if, *p*).

double-counting. Differences in domain or subject matter are simply differences in content. However, once this kind of difference has been taken on board, there is no need to endorse an additional kind of difference in terms of truth. Blackburn thinks that a recent objection against deflationism—due to Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons (2007)—poses more of a challenge. Bar-On & Simmons argue that the deflationist cannot account for the Fregean thought that to assert is to present as true. For here "true" cannot be disquoted away, contra deflationism. Blackburn considers a pragmatist-deflationist response due to Brandom: assertion is to be accounted for in terms of socio-deontic commitments, or normative commitments incurred by participation in a social practice of reason-giving (e.g., reproach if you have asserted *p* and not-*p* turns out to be the case). Even with an account of the truth norm of assertion that is acceptable by deflationary lights, the question remains whether the deflationist can offer a satisfactory account of assertoric content. Here Blackburn returns to the theme of differences in domain or subject matter. His contention is that in order to account for such differences we need "pragmatist pluralism"—a number of local pragmatisms, each giving a theory of use that is based on our everyday practice and needs and explains why we employ the terms of some specific domain of discourse. In turn, given the focus on explanation and everyday practice and needs, Blackburn thinks the plurality of local pragmatisms is best understood in an expressivist way.

Max Kölbel (Ch. 14) continues the discussion of various -isms, although his attention is restricted to deflationism and inflationism. He sets out to examine two kinds of pluralism about truth. According to the first kind, the truth predicate expresses several distinct concepts. According to the second kind, the truth predicate expresses a single concept, but this concept is the concept of something that can be realized by different properties. On the basis of empirical data (surveys) Kölbel supports the first kind of pluralism, regarded as a thesis about the use of the truth predicate in ordinary language. Ordinary language users acknowledge uses of "true" that support a deflationary truth concept—one that is characterized completely by one *T*-schema . However, they also acknowledge uses of "true" that support a substantive truth concept—one characterizable in terms of some *T*-schema plus a requirement of objectivity (which, as a bare minimum, involves the idea that, if it is correct for anyone to apply the truth concept to *p*, then it is a mistake for everyone to deny the concept of *p*). Kölbel's "concept pluralism" gives credit to both deflationism and inflationism: each carves out a legitimate truth concept. Interestingly, as Kölbel himself emphasizes, on this view ordinary uses of "true" come out ambiguous between expressing the deflationary truth concept and its substantive counterpart. In this respect the proposed form of pluralism is different from the pluralist views considered above. On all these other views, there is one truth concept—characterized by a set of inflationary core principles—that is expressed by uses of "true".

Kölbel also discusses the prospects of the second form of pluralism (one concept, several properties). He suggests that a stable form of pluralism about truth properties is likely to call for a corresponding pluralism about propositions. More specifically, the pluralist cannot take truth properties to apply solely to structured propositions; rather, she must be willing to accommodate different types of propositions to which the various truth properties can apply.

While Kölbel is moved to endorse a form of pluralism by giving simultaneous credit to inflationism and deflationism, Julian Dodd (Ch. 15) credits only the latter. Dodd endorses deflationary monism: truth is one, and it is deflationary. He maintains that this view is the default position, owing to its theoretical simplicity, and that a compelling argument is needed to balk from it to anything more substantive. Moreover, the usual lessons learned from the scope problem fail to shoulder the burden of proof, argues Dodd, simply because the scope problem itself is a psuedo-problem. Like Blackburn's 'double-counting' response, Dodd's claim is prompted by the so-called 'Quine-Sainsbury' objection, which suggests that taxonomical differences among kinds of true statements in different domains can be accounted for simply by doing basic ontology in object-level languages rather than proliferating truth properties:

> There are philosophers who stoutly maintain that "true" said of logical or mathematical laws and "true" said of weather predictions or suspects' confessions are two uses of an ambiguous term "true". […] What mainly baffles me is the stoutness of their maintenance. What can they possibly count as evidence? Why not view "true" as unambiguous but very general, and recognize the difference between true logical laws and true confessions as a difference merely between logical laws and confessions? (Quine 1960: 131)

> [E]ven if it is one thing for 'this tree is an oak' to be true, another thing for 'burning live cats is cruel' to be true, and yet another for 'Buster Keaton is funnier than Charlie Chaplin' to be true, this should not lead us to suppose that 'true' is ambiguous; for we get a better explanation of the differences by alluding to the differences between trees, cruelty, and humor. (Sainsbury 1996: 900)

However, rather than running the objection as one disdainful of ambiguity claims about the predicate "is true", such as Kölbel's, Dodd suggests that Quine-Sainsbury objection should be generalized to truth properties.

Dodd then turns his attention to criticizing arguments by Wright and Lynch, respectively, that are meant to support a move to pluralism. Wright's motivation for pluralism is that it enables us to understand the sustained discussions between realists and anti-realists in such a way that neither party comes out as being *generally* misguided. Realism gets it right with respect to some domains, anti-realism with respect to others. Lynch's argument in favor of pluralism is the scope problem: no monist theory plausibly applies across all truth-apt discourse. Against Wright, Dodd argues that the deflationist, too, can make sense of the dispute between realists and anti-realists. Since deflationism is the default position, other things being equal, deflationism trumps pluralism. Against Lynch, Dodd observes that the scope problem is best conceived as an argument against *inflationary* forms of monism, and as such, deflationism still has to be ruled out as a viable option. Lynch tries to do just that by offering two independent considerations against the view: first, deflationism cannot give a truth-conditional account of meaning and content because the view denies that truth does any

genuinely explanatory work, and second, deflationism cannot account for the normativity of truth. Dodd argues that both replies miss their mark; in both cases the deflationist has a response ready at hand. Given these responses, deflationism trumps pluralism once more.

Beall (Ch. 16) explores what he calls "deflated truth pluralism", a certain kind of pluralism about truth predicates. A truth predicate T for a language L is transparent just in case, for any sentence p in L, $T\langle p\rangle$ and p are intersubstitutable in all (non-opaque) contexts. For Beall, a deflationist is someone who holds both that transparent truth is our fundamental truth predicate, and that it serves only certain logical and expressive functions. Of course, there may be other truth predicates too; but they are all parasitic on the transparent truth predicate in the sense that they are derived from the transparent truth predicate using only logical resources.

Subsequently, one way to motivate the need for several truth predicates is the search for an adequate solution to the Liar Paradox and other semantic paradoxes. Beall outlines a response to the paradoxes that involves a transparent truth predicate, but also at least one non-transparent predicate. The response carries a commitment to truth pluralism because there are several truth predicates, each of which designates something different, and to deflated truth pluralism because the transparent truth-predicate is taken as fundamental and the non-transparent predicates as derived through reliance on logical resources only. Like Hinzen's internalist deliberations on methodological naturalism about truth and the possibility of pluralism, Beall's contribution adds variety to the pluralist landscape: not only are there inflationary versions of pluralism—one might also be a deflationary pluralist. Furthermore, Beall's paper provides a response to Dodd's argument that pluralism is always trumped by deflationism. Again, according to Dodd, deflationary monism is the default position; however, if Beall is correct, perhaps the best way to deal with the paradoxes is to endorse a form of deflationary *pluralism*. So, if a solution to the semantic paradoxes is thought to be a pressing task (as Beall and many others would have it), this would seem to support a move away from deflationary monism.

Aaron Cotnoir (Ch. 17) notes that the paradoxes have been largely neglected in the literature on pluralism, and like Beall, urges pluralists to start paying attention to the them because they are as much a problem for pluralists as they are for anyone else. Indeed, the paradoxes might even serve as a hard constraint on the adequacy of candidate versions of pluralism. Cotnoir suggests that several versions of pluralism about truth predication are subject to paradox on fairly minimal assumptions, and so, should be abandoned or considerably modified. Consider first any moderate form of (predicate) pluralism according to which there is a truth-predicate T_U that applies across all truth-apt discourse, in addition to a range of domain-specific truth-predicates T_1, …, T_n, and then suppose that T_U satisfies the T-schema. This will be the case on the views of prominent pluralists like Wright and Lynch, and perhaps Beall. Then it is straightforward to derive a paradox. Suppose that the pluralist rejects T_U and endorses only the domain-specific truth-predicates T_1, …, T_n (but thinks that there are infinitely many such properties, i.e. that there is some T_i for every $i \in \omega$). Does this free her view from paradox? Not necessarily. Many pluralists would grant that

the *T*-schema holds for the domain-specific properties F_1, …, F_n. However, the universal truth-predicate T_U is definable in terms of T_1, …, T_n and disjunction (any sentence p is T_U just in case it is T_1 or … or T_n), and if the *T*-schema holds for each of T_1, …, T_n, it holds for T_U too. But that means that paradox has returned. Cotnoir sees no need for the pluralist to give up on the *T*-schema for any truth-predicdate or to adopt a non-classical logic in order to deal with the paradoxes. Instead Cotnoir suggests rejecting infinite disjunction, which is needed to obtain T_U from the infinitely many domain-specific properties F_1, …, F_n.

5. Concluding remarks

The contributions to Part I of the volume serve to table a range of issues internal to the pluralist camp. In particular, how are we to understand the idea of alethic potency that is so fundamental to pluralism? Part II of the volume explores the issue whether the unity of truth and its wide range of applicabilty can be accommodated by the correspondence theory, a traditionally very prominent view in the truth debate. Part III connects pluralism with deflationism, and paradox.

Our goal in this introduction has been to provide an overview of the volume. The overview no doubt betrays the richness and level of detail of each contribution. Even so, our hope is to have said enough to convince the reader that the present volume makes for a valuable contribution to the truth literature—that, indeed, truth pluralism is interesting in its own right, but likewise connects with several other views and fundamental themes or issues in significant ways. Much work remains to be done, of course, but the present volume should make for a good start.

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